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FEDERAL STUDENT AID: CAN WE SOLVE A PROBLEM
WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND?
Deanne Loonin* and Julie Margetta Morgan**
I. INTRODUCTION
It is not hard to see that our nation’s student loan program is in trouble. It is
much harder to find ways to fix it. The Bipartisan Policy Center listed the following
failings of student debt: “Too many students rely excessively on loans to finance
their degrees, too few borrowers can afford to repay their loans once they leave
school, and hundreds of billions of dollars in student debt are sitting on federal
balance sheets.”1
A more comprehensive list would consider the program’s failure to meet the
broader goals of the federal government’s investment in higher education, including:
•

Failure to improve equal access to higher education: Despite billions of
government dollars invested in student loans, the difference in college
graduation rates between the top and bottom income groups has widened
by nearly 50% over two decades.2

*
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1
KENNETH MEGAN & SHAI AKABAS, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., AMERICA’S STUDENT
DEBT EXPLOSION: UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE 3 (2017),
https://cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/BPC-Higher-EducationAmericas-Student-Debt-Explosion.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B4Y-RPJL].
2
Tami Luhby, College Graduation Rates: Income Really Matters, CNN: MONEY (Nov.
28, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/21/news/economy/income_college/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/83NL-L53S]. See also ALANNA BJORKLUND-YOUNG, JOHNS
HOPKINS INST. FOR EDUC. POLICY, FAMILY INCOME AND THE COLLEGE COMPLETION GAP
(Mar. 2016), http://edpolicy.education.jhu.edu/family-income-and-the-college-completiongap/ [https://perma.cc/7WHR-KZTU] (noting that college graduation rates amongst students
from the lowest socio-economic backgrounds are 14% compared to 60% of students from
high-socio economic backgrounds); Charles T. Clotfelter, How Rich Universities Get Richer,
THE CHRONICLE REVIEW, Dec. 8, 2017, at B17 (“[C]olleges have performed much the same
role in America that they have everywhere in modern societies; to educate the children of
the ruling upper-middle class and, in effect, to reproduce those elites.”).
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Failure to make college affordable for low-income students: College costs
have continued to rise, forcing more students to turn to loans for support.3
Failure to meet the American economy’s need for an educated workforce:
The nation’s $100 billion annual investment in loans to educate the next
generation is not meeting our needs; by 2020, the United States will miss
the mark on college-educated workers by five million.4

By almost any measure used to justify the government’s investment in student
loans—ensuring that all students have access to college, closing our country’s
wealth and opportunity gaps, or educating young people to compete in a global
economy—the federal student loan program is failing. Furthermore, instead of
moving our society forward, the student loan program is setting us back, leaving
millions of students in default and forcing others to delay buying homes, saving for
retirement, and participating fully in our economy.5
These failures are not evenly distributed—they fall squarely on the low-income,
first-generation, historically underserved populations that the government was
trying to assist in the first place. The failure to improve affordability deeply affects
low-income families; for the lowest quintile of family income, the net price of
attendance at a four-year public school is 64% of income, compared to 22% for
middle income and 6% for high income.6 The burdens of taking on student loan debt
are not evenly distributed either: African American students are far more likely to
borrow than their white peers (70% vs. 57%), and, alarmingly, they are far more
likely to default on those loans (49% vs. 21%).7
3

See COLLEGEBOARD, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2017 7 (2017),
https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2017-trends-in-college-pricing_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HJ7B-9EYR]. Authors’ calculations based on data from the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System’s Institutional Characteristics and Student Financial
Aid Components show that, for the lowest quintile of family income ($0-$30,000), net price
at a public 4-year college accounts for 64% of income. See id. at 20.
4
ANTHONY CARNEVALE ET AL., GEORGETOWN PUB. POL’Y INST.: CTR. ON EDUC. AND
THE WORKFORCE, RECOVERY: JOB GROWTH AND EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS THROUGH
2020 2 (2013), https://cew-7632.kxcdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Recovery2020.ES
_.Web_.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9HZ-S8TP].
5
See Ryan McCarthy, The Student Debt Domino Effect: The CFPB’s Rohit Chopra on
How it’s Holding Back Our Economy, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 10, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/06/10/the-student-debt-dominoeffect-the-cfpbs-rohit-chorpa-on-how-its-holding-back-our-economy/?utm_term=.e1ab5a
512dc9 [https://perma.cc/F9V2-5VJ8].
6
Authors’ calculations based on Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System data.
Includes both dependent and independent first-time, full-time students who are Title IV
recipients. Low-income = $0–30,000, middle-income = $48,000–75,000, high-income =
$110,000 and up. See NAT. CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.: INTEGRATED POSTSECONDARY EDUC.
DATA SYS., https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/ [https://perma.cc/4SM9-MPEG] (last visited Apr. 9,
2018).
7
Ben Miller, New Federal Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African American
Borrowers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 16, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.american
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Not surprisingly, policy wonks from across the political spectrum have weighed
in with proposals on how to address these failures.8 With the Higher Education Act
due for reauthorization, these proposals may get serious consideration over the next
few years, and some may even become law. But the enthusiasm to jump in and
provide solutions to fix the federal student loan system is premature, and experts are
writing policy prescriptions without ever fully diagnosing the problem. We cannot
assess or resolve the failures of the student loan program because we do not have
sufficient information about one key facet of it: the way the program is governed
and administered by the federal government and its contractors.
This Article argues that we have insufficient information to fully explore the
problems in the student loan program, and that greater transparency into the
program’s administration is a necessary first step. Part II describes the gaps in
existing information on student loans and the resulting gaps in policy prescriptions.
Part III illustrates some of the available evidence suggesting that the Department of
Education’s policies and practices may be affecting the student loan program’s
success. Part IV argues that improved public access to information about the
administration of the student loan program would enhance both policymaking and
outcomes for student loan borrowers. Part V describes some of the available avenues
for improving access to information on the student loan program, and Part VI
considers some ways to use these tools more effectively.
II. GAPS IN EXISTING INFORMATION
In the last five years, higher education policy advocates have made a concerted
effort to improve the availability of data on the state of higher education.9 These
efforts have focused on student characteristics, progression, and outcomes data, all
of which are essential to understanding how students fare in college, and the role
that colleges play in determining students’ outcomes and experiences.10 However,

progress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2017/10/16/440711/new-federal-datashow-student-loan-crisis-african-american-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/3VZ6-K584].
8
See, e.g., BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., REIMAGINING AID DESIGN AND DELIVERY
(RADD) REPORTS, https://postsecondary.gatesfoundation.org/areas-of-focus/incentives/
financial-aid/reimagining/ [https://perma.cc/3MLM-T29U] (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
9
See INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y, POSTSEC DATA, http://www.ihep.org/postsecdata
[https://perma.cc/W492-54T6] (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
10
See JENNIFER ENGLE, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., ANSWERING THE CALL:
INSTITUTIONS AND STATES LEAD THE WAY TOWARD BETTER MEASURES OF
POSTSECONDARY PERFORMANCE 2 (2016), https://postsecondary.gatesfoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/AnsweringtheCall.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGX6-SHQH]; AMANDA
JANICE ROBERSON ET AL., INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POLICY, A BLUEPRINT FOR BETTER
INFORMATION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FEDERAL POSTSECONDARY STUDENT-LEVEL
DATA NETWORK 3 (2017), http://www.ihep.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/pubs/a_blue
print_for_better_information_ihep.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8TY-25HX].
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these efforts largely miss out on data and other information that would reveal the
role that the federal government and its contractors play in the success or failure of
student aid programs.11
At the national level, the public has three primary sources of information about
student loans. First, the National Center for Education Statistics (“NCES”) posts
data from the Integrated Postsecondary Data System (“IPEDS”), which is a series of
surveys completed by institutions to report aggregate data on their students.12 IPEDS
offers the public a view into who gets student loans in a given year, how much, and
the proportion of students repaying their debt, disaggregated by institution and by
certain student characteristics.13 Second, NCES administers a set of national surveys,
including the Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study and the National
Postsecondary Student Aid Study, which use representative samples of students to
report data on borrowing, including cumulative debt and private loan debt, by certain
student and institutional characteristics.14
Finally, the Department of Education publishes some information about the
performance of student loans on its Federal Student Aid Data Center and associated
Federal Student Aid (“FSA”) sites.15 Through the Data Center, the public can see
information on the volume of applications and disbursement of federal student loans,
as well as aggregate information about the student loan portfolio, including
breakdowns by debt size, location, school type, loan status (in school, deferred, in
forbearance, etc.), repayment plan, and delinquency status.16 The Data Center
includes limited information on loans by servicer, including repayment status and
repayment plan.17 Exploring FSA’s websites can provide a bit more information
about the administration of student loans, including customer service scores for the
major federal student loan servicers.
Together, these resources tell us little about how the student loan program
actually functions. The data in these systems are fairly useful for illustrating student
and borrower outcomes, but they do little to suggest why borrowers ended up the
way they did, and what could be done to improve their results. The most obscure
11

It is important to note that this Article is not a critique of student-level data efforts.
The authors believe these efforts are valuable and should be continued; however, the authors
believe that these efforts miss out on critical data and information necessary to understand
the student loan program.
12
See JAMEY RORISON & MAMIE VOIGHT, INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POLICY, PUTTING
THE “INTEGRATED” BACK INTO IPEDS: IMPROVING THE I NTEGRATED POSTSECONDARY
EDUCATION DATA SYSTEM TO MEET CONTEMPORARY DATA NEEDS 3 (2016),
http://www.ihep.org/sites/default/files/uploads/postsecdata/docs/resources/putting_the_inte
grated_back_into_ipeds.pdf [https://perma.cc/DHQ8-A5JK].
13
See id. at 6.
14
See NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, SURVEYS AND PROGRAMS,
https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/SurveyGroups.asp?group=2 [https://perma.cc/5WUW-UGPD]
(last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
15
FED. STUDENT AID, DATA CTR., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/data-center
[https://perma.cc/5RY2-K8WL] (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
16
See id.
17
See id.
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piece of the puzzle is the participation of the federal government and its contractors.
Though the FSA Data Center offers some information on outcomes by servicer, there
is not nearly enough detail to help the public understand whether servicers are
implementing student loan policy in a way that increases borrowers’ likelihood to
repay or to seek repayment assistance when necessary.
Given that the data available at the state and federal level are so closely tied to
students and institutions, it is likely not a coincidence that most of the proposed
solutions to our student aid problems aim to change student and institutional
behavior. Persistently high student loan delinquency and default rates are prime
examples of this phenomenon. The most recent cohort default rate on federal student
loans stands at 11.5%, meaning more than 11% of student loan borrowers fail to
make payments for at least 360 days within the first three years of entering
repayment.18 Data on loan repayment status show that the problem is bigger than
that: about 20% of Federal Direct Loans are more than ninety days delinquent on
their debt.19 Clearly, there is a problem with student loan repayment and default.
The prevailing wisdom in the D.C. policy community focuses on student and
institutional responsibility for the default problem. Policy organizations suggest
offering more robust and timely borrower counseling and repayment options that are
more generous, easier to understand, or more reliant on automatic payments.20 Some
also propose giving schools more “skin in the game,” or even giving institutions
more discretion on how they dole out student loans.21 It is possible that adjustments
to borrower behavior and college practices will improve repayment, but these policy
suggestions are too often based on speculation rather than sound research and
information.
There are other possible contributing causes of repayment and default
problems. One often overlooked consideration is the impact of government and
private servicers’ practices on repayment. This would seem like a logical and
important area of inquiry given that servicers are the borrower’s primary point of
contact. If servicer behavior is a contributing cause of the repayment and default

18

FED. STUDENT AID, OFFICIAL COHORT DEFAULT RATES FOR SCHOOLS,
https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr.html [https://perma.cc/4HQSN9AD] (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
19
FED. STUDENT AID, DIRECT LOAN PORTFOLIO BY DELINQUENCY STATUS (2018),
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/DLPortfoliobyDelinqu
encyStatus.xls [https://perma.cc/6TCE-6M56].
20
See BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., supra note 8.
21
See, e.g., BETH AKERS, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, RISK-SHARING: AN EFFICIENT
MECHANISM
FOR
FUNDING
STUDENT
LOAN
SAFETY
NETS
(2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/risk-sharing-an-efficient-mechanism-for-fundingstudent-loan-safety-nets/ [https://perma.cc/ZD3F-QVG6]; LINDSAY AHLMAN ET AL., THE
INSTITUTE FOR COLLEGE ACCESS AND SUCCESS, A NEW APPROACH TO COLLEGE
ACCOUNTABILITY: BALANCING SANCTIONS AND REWARDS TO IMPROVE STUDENT
OUTCOMES (2016), https://ticas.org/sites/default/files/pub_files/ticas_risk_sharing_working
_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C87-VU3D].
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problem, as some limited studies conclude,22 this would suggest a completely
different set of policy changes, centering on oversight and incentives for student loan
servicers.
III. HOW DOES THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROBLEM?
The problems detailed above—failure to improve educational equity, lack of
affordability, and poor outcomes for a substantial portion of borrowers—can have
many causes. To date, the education policy community has focused on student,
borrower, and institution-level solutions. But there are ample reasons to suspect that
the federal government plays a role in these failures, and therefore should be
considered as part of any solution. This Part will review some of the indicators that
the federal government may be at least partly to blame for student aid’s failings.
A. Canaries in the Coal Mine
The first indicator that the federal government itself is adding to the problems
inherent in the student loan program is the series of scandals that have occurred over
time, suggesting that the Department of Education is, at the very least, failing to
properly oversee its lending programs. A truncated list of incidents might include
anything from sweetheart deals to school administrators who funneled students
toward certain lenders,23 deceptive lender marketing tactics24 to illegal interest rates
for members of the military,25 and the failure to return millions of overpaid
government funds.26 The scandals each produced a minor uproar and, in some cases,
22

AMANDA JANICE & MAMIE VOIGHT, INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y, MAKING SENSE
OF STUDENT LOAN OUTCOMES: HOW USING REPAYMENT RATES CAN IMPROVE STUDENT
SUCCESS 14 (2016), http://www.ihep.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/pubs/ihep_repay
ment_rate_paper_6b.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD3F-QVG6]; COLLEEN CAMPBELL &
NICHOLAS HILLMAN, THE ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE TRUSTEES, A CLOSER
LOOK AT THE TRILLION: BORROWING, REPAYMENT, AND DEFAULT AT IOWA’S COMMUNITY
COLLEGES 30–32, (2015), https://www.acct.org/files/Publications/2015/ACCT_BorrowingRepayment-Iowa_CCs_09-28-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TG3-4WPC].
23
Scott Jaschik, Loan Scandal Escalates, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 10, 2007),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/04/10/loans [https://perma.cc/5FKC-DUZY].
24
Jonathan D. Glater, Another Student Loan Company Settles with New York, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 2, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/03/business/03lend.html
[https://perma.cc/4UFP-3R5N].
25
DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF PUB. AFF., NEARLY 78,000 SERVICE MEMBERS TO BEGIN
RECEIVING $60 MILLION UNDER DEP’T OF JUST, SETTLEMENT WITH NAVIENT FOR
OVERCHARGING ON STUDENT LOANS (May 28, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
nearly-78000-service-members-begin-receiving-60-million-under-department-justicesettlement [https://perma.cc/PPJ9-JKFH].
26
See generally Sam Dillon, Whistle-Blower on Student Aid Is Vindicated, N.Y. TIMES
(May
7,
2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/07/washington/07loans.html
[https://perma.cc/3L4U-EE2P] (describing student loan companies’ improper collection of
hundreds of millions in federal loan subsidies); U.S. SENATE, HEALTH, EDUC., LAB. AND
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legislative change, but none resulted in a full-scale examination of the Department’s
practices. These hints at broader problems in the administration of the student loan
program are strong indicators that more work needs to be done to understand the
government’s role in administering student loans, the effects of its practices on
borrowers, and the incentives or other drivers that affect the government’s practices.
B. Unclear Goals, Mixed Incentives
Another reason to suspect that the federal government has a role in the nation’s
student loan problems is the fact that the program’s goals create mixed incentives.
It may seem obvious that the success of the student loan program would be measured
primarily by how well it serves students, but this is not the case. As a governmentsponsored, taxpayer-funded program, the student loan program is measured by both
borrower outcomes and taxpayer outcomes. In many cases, the best outcome for a
borrower conflicts with the best outcome for a taxpayer. For example, when schools
defraud their students, the best result for the borrower is a full cancellation of the
loan. But, at least in a short-sighted sense, the expense of cancellation is not in the
taxpayers’ best interest.27
These unclear, mixed goals are not just an implicit part of lending government
money to students—they are explicit in the structure of FSA, the body that
administers the student loan program. FSA is the Department of Education’s
operating arm of the financial aid programs.28 FSA became the government’s first

PENSIONS COMMITTEE, REPORT ON MARKETING PRACTICES IN THE FEDERAL FAMILY
EDUCATION LOAN PROGRAM, (June 14, 2007), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED497127.
pdf [https://perma.cc/GP6L-96GW] (focusing on the preferred lender scandal and other
marketing abuses); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF PUB. AFF., JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REACHES
$60 MILLION SETTLEMENT WITH SALLIE MAE TO RESOLVE ALLEGATIONS OF CHARGING
MILITARY SERVICE MEMBERS EXCESSIVE RATES ON STUDENT LOANS (May 13, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-60-million-settlement-salliemae-resolve-allegations-charging [https://perma.cc/AY24-V3EG].
27
Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 75926, 76051 (Nov. 1, 2016)
(“Borrowers who ultimately have their loans discharged will be relieved of debts they may
not have been able to repay, and that debt relief can ultimately allow them to become bigger
participants in the economy, possibly buying a home, saving for retirement, or paying for
other expenses.”).
28
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. OF FED. STUDENT AID, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016),
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/FY-2016-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.
cc/X5A9-XY44].
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performance-based organization (“PBO”) in 1998.29 The idea was to create a more
efficient program that, in the words of former House Education Committee
Chairman Bill Goodling, would be “run like a business” and “focus on bottom-line
results.”30
The potential for conflict existed from the start. What does it mean, for
example, to focus on bottom line results in a government program that also includes
mandatory flexible repayment options, discharges, and other types of borrower
relief? The PBO statute lists a number of purposes for FSA, including: improving
service to students and other participants in the student financial assistance
programs; reducing costs of administering the programs; increasing accountability
of the officials responsible for administering the programs; providing greater
flexibility in the management and administration of the programs; and developing
and maintaining timely data to ensure program integrity.31 The statute does not
clarify which goals are most important or how to choose if, for example, limiting
costs makes it impossible to improve services or provide mandatory relief to
borrowers.32
It is possible for policymakers and program administrators to pursue more than
one goal and even to serve multiple constituencies. However, the lack of clarity
about which goals and constituencies rank highest has contributed to the systemic
failures and confusion in student aid policymaking and administration. It has also
made it exceedingly difficult to measure effectiveness.
C. Limiting Costs at All Costs
FSA’s frequent emphasis on the stewardship of taxpayer funds in its decisionmaking also provides reason to wonder about whether it has exacerbated the failures
of the student loan program. For example, when faced with the aftermath of closed
fraudulent institutions, the Obama Administration’s reluctance to take on full relief,
according to news reports, stemmed largely from wariness of the financial costs as
well as the potential political fallout of bailing out tens of thousands of borrowers.33
Current Education Secretary Betsy DeVos similarly cited conservation of
29

THE WHITE HOUSE, CREATING THE GOVERNMENT’S FIRST PERFORMANCE-BASED
ORGANIZATION TO MODERNIZE STUDENT AID DELIVERY (October 7, 1998),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/news/pbofact.html
[https://perma.cc/D3ZZJQYQ].
30
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STUDENT FINANCIAL AID ADMINISTRATORS, IMPROVING
OVERSIGHT AND TRANSPARENCY AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S OFFICE OF
FEDERAL STUDENT AID: NASFAA RECOMMENDATIONS, at 1 (May 2017),
https://www.nasfaa.org/uploads/documents/NASFAA_FSA_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
54Y2-ZVAV] [hereinafter NASFAA Report].
31
20 U.S.C. § 1018(a)(2) (2018).
32
See id.
33
Stephen Burd, Borrower’s Remorse, WA. MONTHLY (Sept.–Oct. 2017),
http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/septemberoctober-2017/borrowers-remorse/
[https://perma.cc/SA54-HWF4].
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government funds as a primary reason for opposing full relief to defrauded students.
Citing the cost of implementing proposed regulations, DeVos stated, “[w]hile
students should have protections from predatory practices, schools and taxpayers
should also be treated fairly as well.”34
Another area in which stewardship of funds seems to trump all other interests is
in student loan collections. FSA’s servicers employ ruthless tactics to collect on past
due debts. In one case, FSA’s contractor blocked a bankruptcy claim by arguing that
trips to McDonald’s constituted a “luxury” making a borrower undeserving of
discharge.35 Government officials might argue that Congress tied their hands by
mandating extreme collection powers like wage and tax refund garnishment, Social
Security offsets, limits on bankruptcy, and a lack of statute of limitations.36 This
ignores the fact that the government has discretion in the use of these powers—
discretion that it rarely chooses to employ. For example, the Department has chosen
to instruct its contractor ECMC to pursue highly aggressive and costly litigation
tactics even against the poorest borrowers seeking bankruptcy relief.37 Furthermore,
the Department has consistently failed to comply with threshold legal requirements,
including due process protections and borrower defense rights, when administering
these collection powers.38
The irony of all of this nickel-and-diming of distressed borrowers is that the
federal government’s stance on collections only looks responsible. Ultimately, FSA
is not really protecting taxpayers—at least, not as much as it could. If the Department
of Education took a step back from its consuming focus on collection, it would see
that the overall trends point to much bigger levers for ensuring the return on taxpayer
dollars: better policing of low-quality schools that load students up with debt, higher
quality servicing and counseling for borrowers, and more innovative approaches to
funding higher education. Furthermore, increased consideration of the larger goals of
34
Andrew Kreighbaum, DeVos: Borrower-Defense Rule Offered ‘Free Money,’ INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/09/26/devos
-borrower-defense-rule-offered-%E2%80%98free-money%E2%80%99 [https://perma.cc/A
43L-ZQZ9].
35
Natalie Kitroeff, Loan Monitor Is Accused of Ruthless Tactics on Student Debt, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/us/loan-monitor-is-accused-ofruthless-tactics-on-student-debt.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1
[https://perma.cc/DJM6Q9LV].
36
See generally DEANNE LOONIN & PERSIS S. YU, STUDENT LOAN LAW 131–154
(National Consumer Law Center 5th ed. 2015) (detailing the full range of Department of
Education collection powers); 20 U.S.C. § 1091a (2018) (eliminating statute of limitations
for government student loan collection).
37
Kitroeff, supra note 35.
38
See, e.g., Dieffenbacher v. DeVos, 5:17-cv-00342-VAP-KK (C.D. Ca. Feb. 23, 2017)
(challenging Department’s failure to consider defenses to repayment raised by former
Corinthian student in response to wage garnishment action). More information about this
case, including updates, is available at THE LEGAL SERV’S CTR. OF HARVARD LAW SCH.,
DIEFFENBACHER V. DEVOS, http://www.legalservicescenter.org/get-legal-help/predatorylending-and-consumer-protection-unit/project-on-predatory-student-lending/dieffenbacherv-devos/ [https://perma.cc/98PD-7XY6].
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the federal government’s involvement in student aid, like preparing for a competitive
economy or improving access to education, would also suggest a focus on improving
institutional gatekeeping, counseling, and servicing rather than simply preservation
of government funds.
D. Competing Constituencies and Agency Capture
The array of constituencies at FSA, many with interests at odds from both
borrowers and taxpayers, is a significant reason to suspect that FSA plays a role in
our student loan system’s problems. FSA, by its very nature, has multiple
constituencies, often with conflicting needs and goals, including the colleges that
help distribute financial aid and the servicers and debt collectors that handle loans
in repayment. Students and borrowers are just one of the groups to whom FSA is
accountable— and often the least powerful. This is readily apparent from FSA’s
progress measurements in its Annual Report, which evaluate both FSA’s ability to
serve borrowers as well as its relationship with colleges and servicing and
collections contractors.39 Unlike students and borrowers, these other constituencies
have their own lobbying juggernauts.
In some cases, servicers, collectors, and colleges hardly need to hire lobbyists
to represent their interests to the Department of Education—they can count on staff
on the inside. Agency capture and revolving door problems exist in nearly every
government agency, but it can be particularly acute in the world of federal student
loans given the complexity of the programs and the close working relationship
between FSA and its contractors.40 To give just a few examples, a number of top U.S.
Department of Education officials in President George W. Bush’s administration
previously had worked for student lenders or related groups.41 In May 2017, when
the head of FSA James Runcie abruptly resigned, former private sector servicer
official Matt Sessa took over.42 Since the beginning of the Trump Administration,
39

U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016),
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/FY-2016-Annual-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X5A9-XY44].
40
“Agency capture” refers to the phenomenon of government agencies becoming
susceptible to the influence and control of the corporate entities they are meant to regulate.
The “revolving door” refers to the pattern of employees of regulated entities moving back
and forth between public and private sector employment.
41
See generally Martha Graybow, Revolving Door Eyed in Student Loan Scandal,
BOSTON.COM (Apr. 19, 2007), http://archive.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/
2007/04/19/revolving_door_eyed_in_student_loan_scandal/?rss_id=Boston.com+%252F+N
ews [https://perma.ccVJ99-YZXM].
42
Senator Elizabeth Warren raised concerns about Mr. Sessa even before he
temporarily took over James Runcie’s job duties. In questions submitted to the Department
in July 2016, Senator Warren asked if the Department’s ethics office specifically prohibited
Mr. Sessa from participating in discussions of student loan servicing in light of his prior
employment at student loan servicer PHEAA. Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, Questions
for the Record: ESSA Implemenations Update from the U.S. Secretary of Education on
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Senator Elizabeth Warren and other senators have written numerous letters to the
Department voicing concerns about high level hiring of for-profit school industry
executives, lender executives, and others.43
When legislators and government administrators serve the loudest and richest
constituencies, benefits flow to private companies and schools, often at the expense
of borrowers and students. There is a lot of money to be made from the federal aid
system. For example, the federal government has, in recent years, paid debt collectors
close to $1 billion annually.44 A member of the debt collection industry characterized
the Department of Education debt collection contract as “THE most sought after
contract within this industry.”45 It should not be a surprise that the same wellconnected companies keep winning government contract competitions. In a revealing
2013 email exchange on a debt collection industry web forum, one participant
discussing how to enter the government student loan debt collection market stated
that “[g]etting student loans on contingency takes political connections, period.”46
Another added, “You have to be a huge player in the game and have some type of
connection to even get a piece of the pie from government backed loans.”47
The revolving door can lead to corruption and conflicts of interest, but it can
also more quietly undermine effective administration of government programs. As
Steven Waldman notes in his history of the Clinton Administration’s national
service and student aid bills, “[t]he problem with a community like higher
education—where staff moves regularly from the Hill to the Department of Education
to trade associations—is not corruption but, potentially, stale thinking and stasis.”48
Waldman writes: “Objectivity in policymaking becomes more difficult. Does the
Education Department staffer who knows he’ll be having drinks at the Front Page

Proposed Regulations (7/12/2016), https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-712_QFRs_for_ED.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TMC-Q22U].
43
See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren, Sherrod Brown, Richard
Durbin, Richard Blumenthal and Sheldon Whitehouse to Dr. Julian Schmoke, Jr., Chief
Enforcement Officer, Office of Federal Student Aid (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2017_09_05_Schmoke%20_letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K4DL-BQTP].
44
Shahien Nasiripour, Americans Are Paying $38 to Collect $1 of Student Debt,
BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2017, 7:39 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201705-19/americans-are-paying-38-to-collect-1-of-student-debt
[https://perma.cc/NSQ7NSZX].
45
Mark Russell, Student Loans: The ARM Industry’s New Oil Well?, INSIDE ARM (Oct.
20, 2011, 7:57 AM), https://www.insidearm.com/blogs/arm-in-focus/00008193-studentloans-the-arm-industrys-new-oil-w/ [https://perma.cc/4UFP-3R5N].
46
Looking to Move into Student Loan Collections, INSIDE ARM (Aug. 2013) (on file
with author).
47
Id.
48
STEVEN WALDMAN, THE BILL: HOW THE ADVENTURES OF CLINTON’S NATIONAL
SERVICE BILL REVEAL WHAT IS CORRUPT, COMIC, CYNICAL–AND NOBLE–ABOUT
WASHINGTON 132 (1995).
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that Tuesday night with the college lobbyists want to sign off on a policy that will
hurt the organization represented by his pal near the nachos?”49
To properly gauge the extent of industry influences at the Department of
Education, one needs to fully understand how those influences play out.
E. Lack of Accountability
For students who default on their federal loans, the accountability is
relentless. . . . Where is that kind of accountability for Sallie Mae?
-Senator Elizabeth Warren, Press Release December 201350
Just as the PBO structure sets the government up for failure by establishing a
set of competing and often conflicting purposes, it also makes it easier for the
government to evade accountability. As the National Association for Student
Financial Aid Administrators (“NASFAA”) explained in a 2017 report, the FSA
Chief Operating Officer and other senior leaders are not confirmed by the Senate
nor are they accountable to students, institutions, or taxpayers.51 There have been no
penalties or consequences for FSA despite frequent reports of noncompliance with
statutory planning and reporting duties.52
The NASFAA report also highlights problems with FSA’s self-assessment
model. According to NASFAA, self-assessments are a common way to begin a
performance evaluation, but they are usually signed off on by a person or board with
oversight responsibility. In the case of FSA, according to NASFAA, the selfassessments stand, “without pushback, oversight, or accountability, which too often
easily allows the organization to excuse away failure to meet goals and targets.”53
NASFAA concludes that while there are many talented and committed individuals
working at FSA, “employee improvement and accountability cannot be achieved
when failure truly isn’t an option.”54
IV. THE NEED FOR MORE INFORMATION
The preceding Parts offer ample reason to suspect that the federal government
itself plays a role in the failures of its student loan program. To fully diagnose the
problem, however, requires more information, not only on student outcomes and
institutional responsibility, but also on the government’s policies and practices in
49

Id.
Press Release, Senator Warren, Senator Warren Questions Treasury and ED on
Accountability for Sallie Mae Rulebreaking and Violations (Dec. 12, 2013),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=245 [https://perma.cc/KWC5-EEJS].
51
NASFAA Report, supra note 30, at 1.
52
Id. at 2. Although these obligations have been in statute since 1998, the Government
Accountability Office and the Department of Education’s Office of Inspector General have
found repeated instances of noncompliance.
53
Id. at 5.
54
Id. at 6.
50
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the administration of student loans. For example, there needs to be more complete
answers on how and whether factors identified here, like pressure to preserve
taxpayer dollars, or unclear goals and mixed incentives, play out in FSA’s policies
and practices. One should also be able to understand the effect Department of
Education policies and practices have on borrower outcomes, and the factors that
drive FSA behavior.
Improved information about the processes and outcomes of the student aid
programs will directly support better policy development, but it will also support
policy change by influencing the work of other audiences in the higher education
policy ecosystem. First, it will give researchers and policy experts access to data and
information they can use to evaluate the effects of current policies and the influences
on them, and to model potential interventions. Second, it can improve individuals’
ability to advocate for their rights in the student aid program by giving them
information relevant to their own student loans, or by providing general information
about an institution, servicer, or government process that would bear upon the
repayment of their loans or their aid eligibility. Third, improved transparency will
enhance accountability for the administrators of the student financial aid program
by revealing undue influence or conflict of interest, as well as by allowing the public
and policymakers to evaluate the efficacy of the implementation of student aid
programs. Finally, improved transparency in federal student aid programs can
increase participation in the policy conversation around student aid by allowing
journalists, policymakers, and advocates to build a broader audience around issues
like student lending, college access, and college affordability.
The provision of private collection agency handbooks, and the Obama
Administration’s 2010 decision to pull them from the Department of Education’s
website, provides one example of how information can be used for both
policymaking and borrower services—as well as the harm caused when the
government is allowed to act in the dark.55 Although intended as a guide for
collection agencies, the handbook was also one of the few ways in which borrowers
and advocates could find guidance on how FSA administered key programs, such as
loan rehabilitation.56 The information it contained helped policy advocates better
understand how those programs were administered, and it helped attorneys working
on behalf of borrowers better understand their clients’ rights. It had been public for
many years, although fairly well hidden in an obscure section of the Department’s
website.
While writing a blog post, reporter Kim Clark called the Education Department
to ask about updates to the handbook and according to Clark, officials there “freaked
out.”57 They told her “that if people find out that they can negotiate a debt reduction
55

Ariel Wittenberg, Education Department Pulls Student Debt Collectors Guide Off
Website,
CTR FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
(May
19,
2014,
12:19
PM),
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/06/16/2644/education-department-pulls-student-debtcollectors-guide-website [https://perma.cc/U4MW-5KW3].
56
DEANNE LOONIN, STUDENT LOAN LAW § 6.3.3 (National Consumer Law Center 4th
ed. 2010) (citing to private collection agency handbook in practice guide for attorneys).
57
Wittenberg, supra note 55.
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of 10 percent they will hold out for it, and all sorts of things like that,” adding that
the Department of Education tried to convince her not to publish information from
the manual.58 After publishing her story, Clark said the “next thing I knew, the
manual was off the site.”59 This was over seven years ago. The government has not
only failed to put the handbook back online, they have also aggressively fought
various groups’ efforts to get an unredacted copy of the handbook through FOIA
requests and other advocacy.60
Researchers and policy experts would particularly benefit from the information
in the handbook about the collection guidelines that the government offers its
contractors, and the financial incentive structures under which those contractors
operate. Individual borrowers need this information to help them understand the
rules for key programs to escape default and get a fresh start. Public access to this
information is also critical to hold the government accountable and to ensure that
the public policy debate is based on real information about how the programs work.
This Article argues that more openness and transparency about student loan
administration will improve policymaking, but, given the body of academic
literature articulating the pitfalls and unintended consequences of government
transparency, it is worth discussing the arguments against transparency. The push
toward open government can be traced back to the Progressive Era of the early
1900s—including Justice Louis D. Brandeis’ famous quote, “[s]unlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants.”61 But much of modern transparency law is rooted in the
post-Watergate era of the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time, openness was
seen as a bulwark against the influence of industry on government, as well as a way
to restore trust in government.62 Since the passage of FOIA in 1968, a vein of
scholarship developed detailing unintended consequences from open government
policies. One subset of these negative consequences has more to do with the
mechanism of transparency—FOIA—than the core concept of government
openness. FOIA is deeply flawed, and some of its limitations are discussed below,
but the failures of this mechanism do not negate the overall benefits of seeking
greater government transparency.
The other subset of critique deserves more careful consideration. To be clear,
these critiques do not argue that complete government secrecy is preferable to
openness.63 Rather, critics essentially argue to be careful about two things: the way
58

Id.
Id.
60
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2012) (The Department often cites this section to exclude
production of documents that would allegedly disclose techniques and procedures for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions). See also New York Legal Assistance Group,
Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 2017 WL 2973976 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2017).
61
Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WEEKLY 10, 10 (Dec. 20,
1913).
62
See Sudha Setty, The President’s Question Time: Power, Information, and the
Executive Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 247 (2008).
63
See David Frum, The Transparency Trap: Why Trying to Make Government More
Accountable Has Backfired, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/
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that the calls for government transparency are framed, and the way they are
implemented. First, calls for transparency can be framed in ways that are helpful to
the cause of good governance, accountability, and curbing corporate influences. But
when advocates call for transparency indiscriminately without tightly describing the
proper uses of transparency, their calls can be coopted in ways that actually work
against those noble purposes.
For example, transparency can be hijacked to actually increase industry
influence, by focusing on publishing information that improves company’s access
to regulatory processes, or their competitive advantage.64 Second, critics argue that
when transparency initiatives are implemented without regard to their effect on the
government’s decisionmaking processes, they can have unintended consequences,
like giving regulators an incentive to change their practices to increase secrecy, or
bogging down administrative and regulatory procedures.
The authors recognize these criticisms, but nevertheless argue that they are not
relevant to the issue of transparency around student loan administration. First, this
Article primarily deals with expanded use of existing transparency mechanisms, and
the criticisms described here are most relevant to the addition of new mechanisms
for transparency, or to generic calls for greater government transparency. To the
extent that the authors argue in subsequent Parts for more affirmative disclosures,
these critiques are taken into account and addressed as much as possible. Second, it
is clear that transparency is not an end in itself; rather, it is a means toward greater
accountability, smarter regulation, and more effective student aid programs. Third,
the transparency proposed here will act as a check on undue industry influence by
focusing on information that promotes democratic participation and accountability
for corporate actors like loan servicers and debt collectors. Finally, though there is
some validity to the idea that too much emphasis on openness can have unintended
negative consequences, it is important to evaluate the functions of a particular
agency or program when determining what constitutes “too much.” As described in
previous Parts, the outcomes and functions of the student aid program are largely
opaque, and therefore cannot be considered to be “transparent enough” in their
current state.
Further, the administration of the student aid programs—particularly the
student loan programs—contains an inherent conflict of interest between serving
students and borrowers well, and protecting taxpayer investments. Though federal
law could be tweaked to clarify administrators’ responsibilities with respect to this,
the conflict will always persist. In a case where administrators will always be
seeking to balance the competing interests of two parties, greater transparency is a
way to both maintain accountability and evaluate the state of the equilibrium.
magazine/archive/2014/09/the-transparency-trap/375074/ [https://perma.cc/S86R-6S8L];
Jason Grumet, When Sunshine Doesn’t Always Disinfect the Government, WASH. POST (Oct.
2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/laws-aimed-at-transparency-havehindered-serious-debate/2014/10/02/7c5eb022-48dd-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_story.html?
wprss=rss_opinions [https://perma.cc/BG9U-KXUL].
64
See David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information
Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1112–17 (2017).
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V. ACHIEVING GREATER PUBLIC INFORMATION ABOUT STUDENT FINANCIAL AID:
THE TOOLS IN THE TOOLBOX
If improved public access to information is essential to better policy and better
outcomes, then one needs to figure out how to get that information out. This Part
examines the transparency tools available to the public, and the ways advocates,
researchers, and attorneys have typically used them. It also highlights the limitations
of these approaches, and the potential for more effective measures in the future.
Those who wish to get information on federal student aid have a number of
tools in their toolbox, each offering benefits and limitations in equal measure. David
Pozen’s 2017 article on the limitations of the Freedom of Information Act articulates
a fairly comprehensive list of the ways in which the U.S. government offers
transparency to the public; the authors adopt that list with some slight
modifications.65 FOIA requests, affirmative disclosure, and executive branch
monitoring have all been used to glean information from the Department of
Education.66 This Article offers two additional pathways: ad hoc disclosure and
disclosure pursuant to litigation.
A. FOIA Requests
The Freedom of Information Act, often considered a landmark advancement of
government transparency and a key to accountability,67 is an obvious tool for
retrieving primary sources from government agencies. FOIA requires the
government to respond to records requests from any person, so long as the requests
do not fall into certain exempted categories.68 Advocates and journalists often try to
use FOIA to access sources, like FSA handbooks described in a previous Part, to
help those interested in either changing policy or supporting individual borrowers to
understand the rules of the game.
Consumer attorneys use FOIA to retrieve documents to fuel their work on
behalf of student loan borrowers.69 FOIA is less frequently used to push for policy
reform, but there are some notable examples. In 2016, the Center for American
Progress and the Century Foundation used a FOIA request to the Department of
Education to compile a set of eligibility applications, compliance audits, and audited
financial statements from institutions applying for continued access to federal
student financial aid to evaluate the Department’s oversight and monitoring
65

Id. at 1102–10.
For the sake of brevity, this Article excludes whistleblowing/leaking, because it is
not a tool that is easily leveraged by advocates.
67
John Moon, The Freedom of Information Act: A Fundamental Contradiction, 34 AM.
U. L. REV. 1157, 1157–60 (1985).
68
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2016) (outlining areas exempted from the Freedom of
Information Act).
69
See, e.g., New York Legal Assistance Group, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Education,
No. 15 CIV. 3818 (LGS), 2017 WL 2973976, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2017).
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structures.70 And in 2014, the National Consumer Law Center used Department of
Education debt collector ranking and evaluation documents, as well as Better
Business Bureau and Federal Trade Commission complaints against Department of
Education debt collectors, to reveal flaws in the contracting and oversight
mechanisms for student loan debt collectors.71
For all of FOIA’s potential, it has some significant drawbacks. It puts the
burden on the requester to know what documents or records the government has. It
is time consuming. In cases where the government denies a request, it is expensive.
Also, the requester has no affirmative burden to share the results of a FOIA request,
so much of the information retrieved sits in a file cabinet rather than building our
collective knowledge base. Finally, its exemptions—particularly those for trade
secrets and law enforcement—make it difficult to retrieve information that pertains
to student loan servicing and debt collection.
B. Affirmative Disclosure
In some cases, either based on policy or simply historical practice, the
government releases information affirmatively to the public. This Article cannot
catalog all of the instances in which the Department of Education does this, but
rather we will focus on instances in which the public has successfully pushed the
Department to broaden its affirmative disclosures to include more useful
information.
Between 2014 and 2017, the Department of Education responded to pressure
from researchers, advocates, and members of Congress who identified a gaping hole
in the knowledge about student loans. Prior to 2014, the Department published very
little information on the performance of the student loan portfolio, leaving the public
with almost no insight into the performance of loans by servicer, geography,
delinquency status, or other key characteristics.72
In a series of updates to the FSA Data Center, the Department of Education
began releasing broader data, including breakdowns of the student loan portfolio by
borrower age, debt size, state, and delinquency status, as well as information on loan
status by servicer.73 Although the release of this information was a huge step
70
Bob Shireman et al., Looking in All the Wrong Places: How the Monitoring of
Colleges Misses What Matters Most, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 12, 2016 12:14 PM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/reports/2016/04/12/133263/looking-inall-the-wrong-places/ [https://perma.cc/HXM8-SPMJ].
71
DEANNE LOONIN & PERSIS YU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., POUNDING STUDENT
LOAN BORROWERS: THE HEAVY COSTS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S PARTNERSHIP WITH DEBT
COLLECTION AGENCIES 26 (2014), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-sldebt-collectors.pdf [https://perma.cc/79CQ-LKYD].
72
Susan Dynarski, We’re Frighteningly in the Dark About Student Debt, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/upshot/were-frighteningly-in-thedark-about-student-debt.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7MLA-7CP8].
73
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FED. STUDENT AID POSTS UPDATED REPORTS TO FSA
DATA CENTER (Mar. 17, 2016), https://ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/031716FederalStudent
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forward, portfolio-level data is insufficient to allow researchers and policy experts
to truly understand the health of the student loan portfolio, as well as institutions’
and servicers’ role in influencing student outcomes—understanding the performance
and risks to a loan portfolio requires the ability to “slice and dice” the data, which is
not possible with static charts.74 A group of researchers and advocates have banded
together as the Postsecondary Data Collaborative to push for access to anonymized
student-level (or borrower-level) data, including the release of existing data extracts
like the Cost Estimation and Analysis Division’s Statistical Abstract (“CEADSTAB”), or the release of student loan data through the National Center for
Education Statistics.75
In some ways, affirmative disclosure is a better approach to government
transparency than FOIA, because it reduces the burden on the public to extract
information from the government, and it creates a culture of disclosure rather than
secrecy. But there are some pitfalls, too. When disclosures are done based on
administrative practice rather than a legal requirement, there is a risk that an agency
will either change or completely reverse its practice of disclosure—particularly
when there is a change in administration resulting from a presidential election. Even
when Congress mandates affirmative disclosures, the resulting information may not
be particularly useful for certain purposes. The disclosures currently mandated under
the Higher Education Act pertaining to aggregate data may be helpful to consumers,
and in some cases researchers, but they are not useful to borrowers seeking
information about circumstances that are unique to their cases.
C. Executive Branch Oversight/Monitoring
Pozen identifies investigations and oversight by Congress as a means of
transparency. This investigatory category is broadened to include monitoring by
executive branch actors that have authority to investigate federal agencies, including
the Government Accountability Office and the Inspectors General. In some cases,
AidPostsUpdatedReportstoFSADataCenter.html [https://perma.cc/7FV7-BAUL]; U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., FED. STUDENT AID, IFAP—ELECTRONIC ANNOUNCEMENTS (Sept. 21,
2017), https://ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/092117FSAPostsNewReportsToFSADataCenter
.html [https://perma.cc/9FT4-Q2CH]; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FED. STUDENT AID POSTS NEW
REPORTS TO FSA DATA CENTER (Sep. 21, 2016), https://ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/0822
16FSAPostsUpdatedReportstoFSADataCenter.html [https://perma.cc/3PMJ-N7DK].
74
See, e.g., COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADM’R OF NAT’L BANKS, LOAN
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 29 (1998), https://www.occ.gov/
publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/loan-portfolio-management/pubch-loan-portfolio-mgmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK5T-PMRP] (“If a bank lacks adequate data
on each loan or does not possess a system to ‘slice and dice’ the data for analysis,
management’s ability to manage the loan portfolio is compromised.”).
75
MATTHEW SOLDNER & COLLEEN CAMPBELL, INST. FOR HIGHER ED POL’Y, USING—
AND IMPROVING—FEDERAL STUDENT AID DATA SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT POLICY ANALYSIS 8
(2016), http://www.ihep.org/sites/default/files/uploads/postsecdata/docs/resources/using_
and_improving_fsa_data_systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8JU-FUTG].
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rather than requesting direct access to government data or primary sources,
advocates and policymakers have leveraged internal government investigatory
methods to get insight into the inner workings of federal student aid. In other words,
instead of digging around in the Department of Education’s files themselves, they
have called upon the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the Department of
Education Inspector General, members of Congress, or others to do the digging and
compile reports that bring ED’s actions into the public view.
There are many examples of this, but the oversight process around
implementation of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”) illustrates how
several of these oversight mechanisms can play out. In 2014, the Department of
Justice and the FDIC reached settlements with the student loan servicer Navient over
Navient’s alleged failure to provide interest rate reductions to service members in
accordance with the SCRA.76
Then Secretary Arne Duncan responded to public outcry by vowing to
undertake his own investigation of Navient and other servicers, but just a few months
later, the Department of Education renewed its contract with Navient without any
investigation.77 A year after the DOJ settlement, the Department of Education finally
released its review of Navient and other servicer’s compliance with SCRA, finding
no wrongdoing on Navient’s part.78 The Department of Education’s review included
some of the data used to reach those conclusions, and several Senators took the
opportunity to review that data for themselves, reaching very different conclusions
that raised concerns about the impartiality of the Department’s review. As a result,
the Department of Education Inspector General reviewed the Department’s report,
and ultimately concluded that the Department of Education had misled the public.79

76
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches $60 Million
Settlement with Sallie Mae to Resolve Allegations of Charging Military Servicemembers
Excessive Rates on Student Loans: Settlement Resolves the Department’s First Lawsuit
Against Student Loan Owners and Servicers for Violating the Rights of Servicemembers
(May 13, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-60-millionsettlement-sallie-mae-resolve-allegations-charging [https://perma.cc/AY24-V3EG].
77
See Chris Carroll, DOJ: Student Loan Entity Penalized for Cheating Veterans, STARS
AND STRIPES (May 13, 2014), https://www.stripes.com/news/doj-student-loan-entitypenalized-for-cheating-veterans-1.282906
[https://perma.cc/L2WV-3W4D];
Shahien
Nasiripour, Elizabeth Warren Questions Education Department’s Competence over Student
Loan Fraud, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 4, 2016, 6:50 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com
/entry/elizabeth-warren-student-loans_us_56d8a6b9e4b0ffe6f8e89f66 [https://perma.cc/L5
U3-8NDX].
78
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Loan Servicers (May 26, 2015), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-departmenteducation-completes-review-major-student-loan-servicers
[https://perma.cc/3M2MWAEK].
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Letter from Sens. Patty Murray, Elizabeth Warren, and Richard Blumenthal to Hon.
Kathleen Tighe (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2015-85_ED_SCRA_Ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/CYB3-9W2L]; Independent Examination by Hon.
Kathleen Tighe (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/misc/scrareport
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This example illustrates both how existing congressional and administrative
oversight vehicles can be used to get information out to the public, and also the
pitfalls of relying on a government agency to analyze data and publicize its
conclusions.
D. Disclosures Pursuant to Litigation
Litigation affords parties the right to retrieve documents that would not
necessarily be disclosed under FOIA or other public transparency methods. In
addition to providing information to the attorney and clients themselves, the
information retrieved through discovery can become public through the pleadings
and dispositions of the cases. For example, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau’s litigation against loan servicers and for-profit colleges have yielded
insights that would not otherwise have easily been obtained by advocates and
policymakers.80 Though discovery allows attorneys and their clients the opportunity
for depositions and document review that can give a glimpse into records not
otherwise available, there are a few obvious limitations. First, litigation can be
hugely expensive, and therefore is not a reasonable tool for transparency alone,
without some other reason for pursuing the case.81 Second, in many instances, a
judge might issue a protective order prohibiting the party from publicizing the
documents obtained through discovery, making it impossible to use the information
for anything other than the litigation itself.
E. Ad Hoc Disclosure
With all of these formal methods of retrieving information from the
government, it is easy to forget that one can simply ask for information from a
government official. There are many instances in which the government has no
affirmative requirement to disclose information to the public, but it also does not
have any restrictions keeping it from doing so. Those with access to decision makers
at the Department of Education can simply request information and receive it. One
example is the disclosure of outstanding student loan volume by interest rate to the

02292016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3R9F-ZG3X]; Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Education
Department Misled Public About Investigation of Loan Servicers, Says Watchdog, WASH.
POST (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/03/01/
education-department-misled-public-about-investigation-of-loan-servicers-says-watchdog/
?utm_term=.1f1bae5524e7 [https://perma.cc/8KCE-QLRD].
80
See, e.g., Complaint, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Corinthian Colleges,
Inc., 2015 WL 10854389 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014) (No. 14 Civ.-7194); Complaint,
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101-RDM) (M.D.
Pa. Jan. 18, 2017), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201701_cfpb_NavientPioneer-Credit-Recovery-complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8B9-BJHR].
81
Litigation of claims related to FOIA requests is, of course, a different story.
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Center for American Progress (“CAP”) in 2013.82 This information was not
available on Department of Education’s FSA data center, and the Department did
not make it available to other organizations. CAP did not have to go through the
rigorous process of a FOIA request—all it had to do was ask. The limitations to this
tool are plain to see: it depends upon the Department’s willingness to assist, and the
power of the requester’s network.
Taken together, these tools and tactics hold enormous promise for uncovering
information about the administration of the student loan program, including better
data on how borrowers fare; insight into the oversight of colleges, servicers, and
collectors that participate in the program; information about college, servicer, and
collector policies and practices; and information on the primary actors who influence
the behavior of players in the student loan system.
VI. CONCLUSION
At over $1 trillion, with more than 8 million borrowers in default, the federal
student loan program is in trouble. There is no question that policymakers will do
their best to fix it in the coming years. The only question is whether they will have
the evidence they need to make informed judgments about what ails our student loan
program, and what can cure it.
The publicly available evidence at this point is insufficient to fully understand
the way that the federal government oversees and implements the student loan
program, and what, if any, role the government has in determining the success or
failure of the program. The limited information available on both the structure and
the practices of FSA suggest that there is substantial reason to suspect that reforms
to the administration of student loans are a necessary precondition to fixing the
student loan program.
In the coming years, advocates, policymakers, and researchers should focus on
gathering data and information on all possible causes of the failures in the student
loan program. As the previous Part describes, the public has a number of tools at its
disposal to procure more data and information. Individual organizations may, of
course, use these tools on their own, but there are compelling reasons to think more
broadly.
By pooling their capacity to make requests and sharing the results, advocates
and researchers can move toward a broader base of information for the entire higher
education policy field. A collective effort toward improved information on the
student loan program might include a narrow set of “research” questions—or areas
of inquiry—that organizations will pursue together, and an independent repository
that stores the results of these inquiries in an easily searchable format.
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